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RIGHTS OF PLEDGEES OF STOCK TO VOTE AND RECEIVE
DIVIDENDS
HARES of stock are not infrequently in modern-day finance
the subject of a pledge agreement. Aside from the ordinary
rights that a pledgee may exercise to protect his interest upon a
default in payment of the debt, questions often arise as to his
right for the duration of the pledge agreement to exercise the
special incidents of ownership that are characteristic of a share
of stock. It can readily be seen that to whatever extent the pledgee
is allowed to exercise these special rights, corporate stock becomes thereby more desirable for security purposes. The scope
of this note will be limited to the pledgee's rights to receive dividends and to vote at corporate elections.'
RIGHT TO DIVIDENDS

Generally, one taking stock as collateral security, in the absence
of an express provision in the pledge agreement to the contrary,
is entitled to receive dividends-whether of additional stock or
of cash-that have accrued during the pledge.2 The pledgee is
2Other rights of shareholders as incidents of ownership with reference to which a
similar inquiry might be made are the rights to enjoin ultra vires acts, to inspect corporate records, and to maintain a representative suit. This note has been limited because
of the seemingly greater importance to the creditor of the topics chosen for consideration.
For recent excellent discussions of the shareholder's rights under consideration, see
as to the right to receive dividends, Hansen v. Bear Film Co., 158 P. (2d) 779 (Cal. App.
1945) ; Rubens v. Marion-Washington Realty Corp., 59 N. E. (2d) 907 (Ind. App. 1945)
(right to compel corporation to declare dividends in equity); 11 FLETCHER, CYCLOPDIA
OF CORPORATONS (perm. ed. 1931) §§ 5321, 5451; 2 HILDEZRAND, TEXAS CORPORATIONS
(1942) § 479. As to the right to vote and control the corporation, see Blaustein v. Pan
American Petroleum & Transportation Co., 263 App. Div. 97, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 934
(1942); 5 FLTrcHER, CYCLOPEDLA OF CORPORATIONS (perm. ed. 1931) §2027 et seq.;
2 HILD RAND, TExAs CoPoaAIors (1942) § 545.
2
National Bank of Commerce v. Equitable Trust Co., 142 C. C. A. 158, 227 Fed. 526
(C. C. A. 8th, 1915) ; Savings Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Crowley, 176 Cal. 543, 169 Pac.
67 (1917) ; Guarantee Co. of North America v. East Rome Town Co., 96 Ga. 511, 23 S. E.
503 (1895); Fairbank v. Merchants National Bank, 132 Ill. 120, 22 N. E. 524 (1889);
Whetsl v. Forgery, 323 Mo. 681, 20 S. W. (2d) 523 (1929), Note (1930) 67 A. L R. 476;
Mandel v. North Hudson Investment Co., 114 N. J. Eq. 336, 118 At. 432 (Ch. Div. 1933) ;
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considered to be entitled to any increase or increment of the thing
pledged which may be used for the purpose of liquidating the
debt or held in trust for the pledgor. This right in the pledgee is
held to arise by implication even though there has been no transfer upon the books of the corporation; and if the corporation
after notice pays the dividends to the pledgor, it becomes liable
in that amount to the pledgee.' The courts are even more strict
where the dividend payments are in liquidation of corporate
assets, for in those cases notice is not a prerequisite of liability.
Under such circumstances, the corporation can protect itself by
requiring that the stock certificate be presented before payment
of the liquidating dividend."
Many jurisdictions have passed legislation,' usually the Uniform Stock Transfer Act with or without modification, in an attempt to make the certificates as far as possible representative of
the shares of which they are evidence.6 Although the statement
has been made by at least one court that the Act does not apply
to a pledge of stock," yet such a decision seems to disregard §3
NOTES (1930) 67 A. L. R. 485, (1932) 30 MICH. L. REV. 974, (1933) 17 MINN. L. REV.
814, (1936) 103 A. L. R. 489. Contra: Reaves Warehouse Corp. v. Easley, 150 Va. 236,
14.2 S. E. 356 (1928).
3Garvey v. Blatchford Calf Meal Co., 119 F. (2d) 973 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941); in re
Decker's Estate, 355 Pa. 331, 49 A. (2d) 714 (1947).
4Bay City Bank v. St. Louis Motor Sales Co., 255 Mich. 261, 238 N.W. 241 (1941).
--Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire (modified), New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin.
Cf. similar statutes in jurisdictions not adopting the act: IOWA COMP. CODE. (1946)
§ 491.50; KA.N. GEi. STAT. (Corrick, 1935) § 17.604; Miss. ANN. CODE (Hemingway,
1917) § 4081; NEV. REv. LAWS (1912) § 1131; OKLA. STAT. ANN. (1936) Tit. 18, § 56;
\yT. GEN. LAWS. (19331 § 5844.
6Leff v. N. Kaufman's, Inc., 342 Pa. 342,20 A. (2d) 786 (1941).
7Garvey v. Blatchford Calf Meal Co., 119 F. (2d) 973 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) ; First
National Bank v. Wellborn, 237 Ala. 183, 186 So. 549 (1939); Bradsher v. Taylor, 185
Ark. 1188, 46 S. W. (2d) 9 (1932). (The Uniform Act does not apply to a pledge of
stock but only to sales and transfers of the title thereof).
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(a)" which authorizes the corporation to treat the registered holder
as the owner of the shares to receive dividends, inasmuch as the
registered holder is often found to be in fact a pledgee. Under a
strict construction of this section, if the pledgee wishes to protect
his rights to dividends, it would be incumbent upon him to have the
transfer noted upon the corporate ledger. The corporation would
also be relieved of liability if it paid the dividends to the registered holder. Registration would serve as notice to all concerned,
including the pledgor's attaching creditors, of the pledgee's interest.
It can be seen that a strict construction making registration
upon the corporate books conclusive of the right to dividends is
academic. The pledgor, who has made no express reservation of
the dividends and under the common-law view would not be entitled thereto, could set up lack of registration by the pledgee as
a defense to a suit against him for the dividends. Moreover, even
though the corporation may have notice of the pledge agreement,
it may through neglect or fraud fail to make the transfer upon
the corporate records. Would the corporation thus be allowed
to escape liability fcr its own acts constituting misconduct? For
these reasons, courts of equity should look beyond the corporate
records when it becomes necessary to do so to protect the pledgee's
right to dividends.
RIGHT TO VOTE AT CORPORATE ELECTIONS

The value of corporate stock for purposes of pledged security
becomes even greater when the pledgee is allowed to exercise
the right to vote at corporate elections. The pledgee in this manner may obtain control of the corporation and is thus assured of
added protection for his debt. However, under the guise of such
an agreement, it is sometimes possible for an ulterior motive to

8

UNrFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT § 3 in 6 UNrIF. LAws ANN. (1922) p. 9: "[CoRPO.ATIONS NOT FoRBDDeN TO TREAT REGISTERED HOLDER AS OWNER]. Nothing in this act

shall be construed as forbidding a corporation, (a) To recognize the exclusive right of a
person registered on its books as the owner of shares to receive dividends, and to vote
as such owner." See Tex. Rev. Civ. STAT. (VERNoN, 19"25) art. 1358-3.
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evade statutory prohibitions;' and insolvency of the corporation
creates other factors which must be considered." It then becomes
incumbent upon the court to determine who shall vote the stock,
the pledgor or pledgee?
Many of the modern authorities still adhere to the commonlaw rule that prima facie the right to vote at corporate elections
is an incident of ownership and follows the legal title." Under
this rule the pledgee, whose interest is considered to be slightly
greater than a mere possessory lien," could not vote the stock.
This right remains with the pledgor unless there is an express
provision in the pledge agreement authorizing the pledgee to
vote." As long as the stock remains in the pledgor's name upon
the corporation's books, it would seem that the corporation must
allow him to vote, for it is generally held that registration on the
corporate books is a condition of the right to vote which the election inspectors cannot waive."' But even though the stock is registered in the name of the pledgee and he appears as the legal
owner, if the pledgor gives adequate notice he is entitled to vote
as he has legal title in the final analysis. He may request that the
pledgee give him a proxy to vote and, if necessary, may compel
it by a suit in equity. But the courts have held that if the pledgor
acquiesces at meetings of the corporation and makes no objection
when his stock is voted, then the pledgor is "estopped" from
claiming that the pledgee did not have authority to vote upon
9

Thompson v. International Silver Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 224, 73 Atd. 833 (Ch. Div. 1907).

10 Cohen v. Big Stone Gap Iron Co., 111 Va. 468, 69 S. E. 359 (1910).

II Drob v. National Memorial Park, 41 A. (2d) 589 (Del. Ch, 1945) , Swain v. Martin, 302 Ky. 381, 194 S. W. (2d) 855 (1946) ; see 5 FLETCHR, CYCLOPEDIA OF CoaPoRTIONS (perm. ed. 1931) § 2032.
22 State Trust and Savings Bank v. Mayes, 67 S. W. (2d) 419 (Tex. Civ. App., 1934);
cl. Lawerence v. 1. N. Parlier Estate Co., 15 Cal. (2d) 220, 100 P. (2d) 765 (1940).
1aFisk Discount Corp. v. Brooklyn Taxicab Trans. Co., 270 App. Div. 491, 60.N.Y. S.
(2d) 453 (1946).
14
In re Schrimer's Will, 231 App. Div. 625, 248 N. Y. S. 497 (1931). See 5 FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS (perm. ed. 1931) § 2019. Contra: State v. Smith, 15 Ore.
98,14 Pac. 814 (1887).
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corporate affairs. This extends to voting upon dissolution of the
corporation as well as ordinary affairs."5
Practical necessity demands that the corporation have some
means of determining who are its stockholders eligible to vote at
elections and participate in management. To require the election
inspector to inquire into the legal title of ever) share of stock
prior to each election would impose upon him a difficult if not
impossible task. For this reason the corporate by-laws should
set forth a date prior to any election on which the record will
be conclusive as to voting rights. Most states have adopted some
statutory measure authorizing and approving such registration; 6
however, such a blanket regulation has been of little avail as a
solution to the pledgor-pledgee problem. The provisions are usually too broad to cover all the conceivable situations involving
pledge agreements, and it still remains a matter for the court to
determine.
A few jurisdictions have enacted varying modifications of the
Uniform Business Corporation Act,' which attempts to bring the
pledgor.pledgee relation in line with rules governing voting in
general by providing that the record holder shall be entitled to
vote." This Act, subject to the criticism of excessive generality,
completely overlooks the pledge contract where the voting right
has been either reserved or granted but the party entitled thereto
is not registered upon the corporate books. Certainlv the courts
should not allow the registered pledgee to vote the stock in such
a way as to defeat the very contract of pledge, nor should they
15 Carter v. Curlew Creamery Co., 16 W. (2d) 584, 134 P. (2d 1 66 119431.
I8Trx. REv. CIv. STAT. (VERNON, 19251 arts. 1328. 1358-3. See THo,%ws0o: oN Cfa'PORATIONS (3rd ed. 1927) § 947.
IT Idaho (modified), Illinois, Indiana (modified), Louisiana, Washington (modified).
5

' MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATIONs ACT § 28-V in 9 UNIF. LAWs ANN. (1942)

p. 119:
"A person whose shares are pledged shall he entitled to %ote thereon until said shares
hav,- been transferred on the books of the corporation to the pledgee. and thereafter the
pledgee shall be entided to vote the same...."
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allow the pledgor to vote the stock so as to prejudice the rights of
the pledgee."
The right to vote is secured to the pledgor in many states by
statute. '0 Such legislation would serve to settle any question where
the pledge agreement is silent upon this issue, but many of these
statutes are absolute in their language ' and thus seemingly inconsistent with the modem trend. There seems to be no valid reason,
other than the equitable considerations pointed out earlier, why
the intention of the parties as expressed in the pledge agreement
should not be enforced. The more strict statutes overlook the
important power of the parties to contract in regard to these
property rights. The courts in the past have looked beyond the
contract to determine the rights and equities of all the parties
concerned, and there is no reason to believe that this procedure
will not continue despite such existing statutes.
Statutory provisions have not been wholly without benefit to
those in the pledgor-pledgee relation. The provision for registration affords a means for the pledgee to ascertain the true ownership of the stock prior to entering into the pledge agreement. By
registering the stock in his name, he removes any question as to
the consummation of the pledge contract; and in some jurisdictions such registration serves to protect him from the pledgor's
creditors.2" The fact cannot be overlooked that the requirement
se'rves as a form of notice to the corporation, relieves it from
191d., I 28-Vi: "Shares of a corporation belonging to said corporation shall not be
voted nor counted in calculating the total voting power of all shareholders of such corporation at any time." The Commissioners on Uniform Laws anticipated a liberal interpretation of § 28-V and proposed -this section to limit its scope. It substantially follows
the common-law rule on this point.
"oMo. REv. STT. (1939) §5351; TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 504.
21
22

ARIZ. CODE (1939) § 53.210.
1n re Schrimer's Will, 231 App. Div. 625, 248 N. Y. S.497 (1931).

m
-Selma
Bridge Co. v. Harris, 132 Ala. 179, 31 So. 508 (1902) ; Maloney v. Strojohann, 206 Iowa 721, 221 N. W. 208 (1928), followed in Maloney v. Hampe, 221 N. W.
526 (1928); cf. Lawerence v. I. N. Parlier Estate Co., 15 Cal. (2d) 220, 100 P. (2d) 765
(1940); McGhie v. First & Amer. Nat. Bank, 217 Minn. 325, 14 N. W. (2d) 436 (1944);
Tombler v. Palestine Ice Co., 17 Tex. Civ. App. 596,43 S. W. 896 (1897).
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certain potential liability in the payment of dividends, and facilitates the determination of the stockholders who are eligible to
vote at corporate elections.
In view of the extent to which wealth in modern economic society is represented by corporate stock, legislation should be
enacted whenever necessary to increase the attractiveness of this
important source of collateral security. To allow the pledgee to
exercise the right to receive dividends and vote gives him added
security and renders the stock more desirable for this purpose.
The Uniform Business Corporations Act, although not completely
satisfactory, would seem a step toward the desired result.
Marcus F. Vascocu.

